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DDI-567-72

24 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, European Division

SUBJECT : Remarks to the Advanced Intelligence Seminar by Mr. Andrew Marshall of the NSC's Net Assessment Group

1. Mr. Marshall's 75-minute appearance before our group on 22 May stressed the "push for product improvement" within the intelligence community. He thus emphasized criticism but, in trying to provide guidance for improvement, he failed to leave the class with any clear ideas save for experimentation with respect to analytic techniques and presentation. Indeed, he said that he would recognize what he wanted when he saw it, and that we should bend every effort toward the achievement of that goal. On balance, Mr. Marshall's remarks had the effect of "turning off" the class.

2. Mr. Marshall said that his function stems from Dr. Kissinger's concern with the quality of the intelligence community's product, a concern which he said has been growing since late 1969. In an effort to improve quality, Mr. Marshall plans to use the newly established NSCIC. Among his current studies are the community's support in the India-Pakistan crisis and similar support on NSSM 69 (Asia Nuclear Policy). He also plans to review the spectrum of economic intelligence. In addition, he has just completed interviews with NSC staffers with respect to their use and appraisal of finished intelligence. He, however, noted that he has not yet collated those findings. Finally, he will hold a meeting this week with China specialists. This meeting will be similar to an earlier one with Soviet specialists.

3. Mr. Marshall next set forth some of his criteria for evaluating the intelligence community's product. First, is the product responsive to the needs of policy-makers? What is the quality of its analyses? How does it compare, for example, with treatment of the same events by the news media and academicians? How is it presented? Are differences within the community treated at some length within the body of the paper or are they relegated to meaningless footnotes? Are alternatives presented (as they should be, in

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

his opinion) and, if so, are numerical probabilities assigned to them?

4. The factor which Mr. Marshall stressed above all others, however, was the need for more speculation in finished intelligence. When I asked his opinion about how Soviet Developments and Soviet Trends meet his need for added speculation, he said that they were steps in the right direction. He appeared particularly pleased with Trends. On the other hand, he appeared to have little appreciation of the efforts required to produce a coordinated CIB item.

5. Mr. Marshall concluded his presentation with some remarks on the goals of his evaluation. Product improvement, of course, is paramount, and this will come mainly via increased feedback to producers. Experimental products involving unspecified new forms of presentation and new techniques should be tried and floated for a reaction. Inasmuch as he views coordination as leading to a muffling of substance, the impression of less coordination in some unspecified publications emerged. He also talked vaguely about a new intelligence career system. In this connection, he asserted that some academicians closely study the Soviets' decision-making process but he finds little, if any, evidence of this activity in the intelligence community.

6. He also sharply criticized what he called "the total lack of R and D on intelligence analysis." When asked to be specific he again was so vague as to promote confusion. He, however, noted that if he were discussing new techniques with an analyst and the analyst became "glassy-eyed," he would fire the analyst. At the same time, he claimed that analysts were overloaded with work. Finally, he repeatedly emphasized that intelligence should be much more closely tied to policy-making. In this connection, he wondered aloud to the effect that perhaps CIA too literally interprets that portion of its charter which proscribes the Agency's involvement in policy formulation.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

Bronson--

Attached for your information is a copy of a memo reflecting one "student's" views on Andy Marshall's presentation to the Agency's Advanced Intelligence Seminar.

Ed Proctor

26 May 1972  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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